Dialogues -- Conversations with my Higher Self (Potentials of Consciousness Book 2)

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Dialogues Conversations with My Higher Self 4.

The author engages in a fascinating and wide ranging metaphysical discussion about the nature of consciousness, reincarnation, and the purpose and meaning of life. Paperback , pages. Published February 7th by Big Picture first published November To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. Lists with This Book. This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Apr 15, Tami rated it it was amazing. Conversations with my Higher Self is a compilation of the author's reflections about a number of metaphysical and scientific matters. Each section takes the form of a question and answer session between the author and a group of individuals that he describes as his Higher Self.

These Higher Self individuals reflect various personality traits that the author possesses ranging from the gentle feminine Sweet to the overbearing Dragon. They may also hold that possession of such a theory constitutes our grasp of mental state concepts Carruthers , ch. While such views accord no priority to the first-person case, they may see a tight connection between self-consciousness and our capacity to think about others: these are simply two aspects of the more general capacity to think about the mind.

Stern part II. On such a view the first-person case is treated as secondary, reversing the traditional picture associated with the argument from analogy. A more ambitious version of this approach to the relationship between self-consciousness and awareness of others, prioritizing the awareness of others, is to argue that knowledge of other minds is a necessary condition of the possibility of self-consciousness.

Well known examples of such arguments can be found in the work of P.

Strawson ch. Since knowledge of other minds is typically considered to be open to sceptical doubt, and self-consciousness is not, such lines of reasoning are transcendental arguments and so potentially open to general criticisms of that form of argument Stroud ; R. Stern , Strawson 99; cf.

In short, we must have knowledge of others' minds if we are self-conscious for the full argument, see P. Strawson ff; for critical discussion, see R. Stern ch.



At its heart is the claim that for my thoughts to have determinate content there must exist another subject who is able to interpret me. As Davidson puts it,. Davidson — Since self-conscious subjects are aware of the contents of their thoughts, they must know that there are other minds, since the sort of intersubjective externalism that Davidson endorses guarantees it. Self-knowledge, on this view, entails knowledge of others for discussion, see R.

At what age can human infants be credited with self-consciousness?

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Is self-consciousness present beyond homo sapiens? Others, for example Rosenthal , claim that phenomenal consciousness entails self-consciousness. If either view is correct then self-consciousness, of some kind, can plausibly be attributed to creatures other than adult humans. But when it comes to more sophisticated forms of self-awareness, matters are less clear.

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What is required is some empirical criterion for judging a creature self-conscious even if, as with infants and non-human animals, they are unable to provide evidence via their use of the first-person pronoun. It is easy to see why this might seem to be so since, if first-person thought involves thinking about oneself as oneself , then it is natural to suppose that a capacity to recognise that a subject seen in a mirror is oneself involves such a thought.

With respect to human infants, the consensus is that success in the mirror test begins at around 15 to 18 months of age, and that by 24 months most children pass Amsterdam ; M. It is not universally accepted, however, that success in the mirror test is an indication of self-consciousness.

For example, Heyes presents an influential critique of the claim that it is a marker of self-awareness, arguing that all that is required for success is that subjects be able to distinguish between novel ways of receiving bodily feedback in order to guide behaviour, on the one hand, and other forms of incoming sensory data, on the other.

Such a view, however, needs to explain why it is that passing the mirror test seems to be connected with the phenomena arguably associated with self-consciousness, such as experiencing shame and embarrassment M. Lewis Another potential marker of self-consciousness is episodic memory, the capacity that we have to recollect particular episodes from our own past experience see Tulving ; Michaelian ; entry on memory. If it is correct that episodic memory essentially involves a form of self-consciousness, and we are able to test for the presence of episodic memory in non-linguistic infants and animals, then we have a way of detecting the presence of self-conscious abilities.

Since, however, episodic memory is not the only form of self-consciousness, the lack of it does not indicate that a creature is not self-aware. Indeed, the much discussed case of K. For example whilst most 3 year old infants can remember presented information, most are unreliable when it comes to the question of how they know—did they see it, hear it, etc. The suggestion here is that the development of the reliable capacity to report how they know some fact reflects the development of the capacity to episodically remember the learning event.

Another body of research pertaining to the question of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals is the work on metacognition and metamemory. Smith ; Beran et al. The suggestion is that if a creature is able to monitor their own level of confidence, they are to that extent self-conscious. One common paradigm for testing metacognitive abilities involves presenting subjects with a stimulus that they must categorise in one of two ways. Crucially, they are also given the opportunity to opt out of the test, with correct categorisation resulting in the highest reward, opting out resulting in a lower reward, and incorrect categorisation resulting in no reward.

The assumption is that the opt-out response reflects a meta-cognitive judgement of uncertainty. Evidence gathered from such a paradigm has been taken to show metacognitive abilities in some birds Fujita et. Smith et. The view that success on metacognitive opt-out tests is indicative of self-consciousness is not uncontroversial, however. On such an interpretation, the research on metacognition does not provide compelling evidence regarding self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals but for critical discussion see J.

Smith ; J. The question of the significance of opt-out tests for attributions of self-consciousness remains controversial. Self-Consciousness First published Thu Jul 13, Self-Consciousness in the History of Philosophy 1. Self-Consciousness in Thought 2. Self-Consciousness in Experience 3. The Conditions of Self-Consciousness 4. One philosopher who accepts the former, intuition-based, account is Locke, who claims that we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence , and an internal infallible Perception that we are.

If Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley can be interpreted as accepting the view that there is an inner perception of the self, on this question Hume stands in stark contrast notoriously writing that whilst there are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self […] For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call myself , I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. Perry 33 As Perry points out, he knew all along that the shopper with the torn sack was making a mess.

As Wright puts it, a claim made on a certain kind of ground involves immunity to error through misidentification just when its defeat is not consistent with retention of grounds for existential generalization.

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The Conditions of Self-Consciousness Much of the philosophical work on self-consciousness concerns its relation to a variety of other phenomena. As Shoemaker puts it, to see rational responses to pain as pain behavior is to see them as motivated by such states of the creature as the belief that it is in pain, the desire to be rid of the pain, and the belief that such and such a course of behaviour will achieve that result. Shoemaker This belief, that she is in pain, is a self-conscious one; it is a belief that she herself is in pain. He writes, [t]o be capable of critical reasoning, and to be subject to certain rational norms necessarily associated with such reasoning, some mental acts and states must be knowledgeably reviewable.

As she writes, [w]hen you deliberate it is as if there were something over and above all your desires, something which is you , and which chooses which desire to act upon.

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Korsgaard Self-consciousness, on this view, is the source of reason. Burge The claim that there is a constitutive connection between self-consciousness and rationality has been met with scepticism by Kornblith , ch. One reason for supposing that there is a connection between self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness is given by Kant, who writes, only because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness do I call them altogether my representations; for otherwise I would have as multi-coloured diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious.

As Kant famously puts it, [t]he I think must be able to accompany all my representations for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me. As Hurley puts it, self-conscious or first-person contents […] are just more contents , to which the problem of co-consciousness [i.

Davidson — Since self-conscious subjects are aware of the contents of their thoughts, they must know that there are other minds, since the sort of intersubjective externalism that Davidson endorses guarantees it. Self-Consciousness in Infants and Non-Human Animals At what age can human infants be credited with self-consciousness? Bibliography Where applicable, page references are to reprinted versions.

Allison, Henry E. Anderson, James R. Anscombe, G. Ross, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ayer, A. Ayers, Michael, , Locke , 2 vols. Beran, Michael J. Black, Deborah L. Brandom, Robert B. Bratman, Michael E. Carruthers, Peter, Logan Fletcher, and J. Carruthers, Peter and Peter K. Smith eds.

2. Self-Consciousness in Thought

Chen, Cheryl K. Chisholm, Roderick M. Clayton, Nicola S. Dancy, Jonathan ed. Phillips Griffiths ed. Diamond, Cora and Jenny Teichman eds. Anscombe , Brighton: The Harvester Press. Strawson , Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.